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Abstract 
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution Abatement 
and Control Expenditure (PACE) in the context of a transition economy such as Romania, in 
contrast to the existing literature which mostly focuses on developed economies. Specifically, 
we use survey data of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics and estimate Multilevel 
Regression Model (MRM) to investigate the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant 
level. Our results reveal some important differences vis-à-vis the developed countries, such as a 
less significant role for collective action and environmental taxes, which suggests some 
possible policy changes to achieve better environmental outcomes. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making several 
efforts to comply with the environmental legislation of the European Union (EU). Such 
compliance requires firms to implement substantial changes at plant level. In particular, both 
capital expenditure and operating costs are associated with pollution abatement efforts.  
Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a decline in 
industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels.  In subsequent stages, 
higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken to 
implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in 
Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice 
in investment programming and project management. In this context, innovative and effective 
financing strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and 
steps must be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address 
priority issues.  
 
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution Abatement 
and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it analyses the 
case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly focuses on 
developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level, namely survey data of the 
Romanian National Institute of Statistics; third, it adopts a suitable econometric method, i.e. the 
Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) to investigate the determinants of environmental 
behaviour at plant level taking into account the context. 
 
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant characteristics, 
formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure through market 
incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of plant PACE. 
However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the population’s 
potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.  Whether the 
influence of these stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its 
development process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes 
work as incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions   3
of regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant 
characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. 
These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors increasing the level of 
plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. They 
point to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to achieve better outcomes. Further, 
it appears that adopting measures to increase the population’s interest in environmental issues 
would also be useful in this respect.  
 
   4
1.  Introduction 
 
Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making 
several efforts to comply with the environmental legislation of the European Union (EU). Such 
compliance requires firms to implement substantial changes at plant level. In particular, both 
capital expenditure and operating costs are associated with pollution abatement efforts.  
Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a 
decline in industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels.  In subsequent 
stages, higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken 
to implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in 
Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice 
in investment programming and project management. In this context, innovative and effective 
financing strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and 
steps must be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address 
priority issues.  
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution 
Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it 
analyses the case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly 
focuses on developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level, namely survey data 
of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics; third, it adopts a suitable econometric method, 
i.e. the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) to investigate the determinants of environmental 
behaviour at plant level taking into account the context. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
relevant literature on environmental performance. Section 3 outlines the econometric 
framework and presents the empirical findings. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Literature Review 
 
The basic economic processes are production and consumption: firms transform natural 
resources, through the production process, into commodities supplied by consumers. However, 
this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When such 
residuals have no economic value then they can be thought of as waste, which may lead to 
pollution.    5
Thus, firms impose costs on other agents in the economy. This is a typical case of a 
negative externality. As prices do not take into account the negative effects on the environment, 
they do not reflect full production costs for the economy; to correct this form of market failure 
it is necessary to introduce environmental regulations, as otherwise there is no incentive for a 
polluting profit-maximizing firm to internalize the externality (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
When formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient, communities may informally 
regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and lobbying. Clearly, 
determining the “right” amount of pollution requires evaluating its negative effects - the 
willingness to pay to reduce pollution is an obvious measure. Environmental issues invariably 
involve a trade-off between using resources for conventional goods and services and using 
those same resources for environmental protection - i.e. how much is the consumer willing to 
pay for a particular level of an environmental good?  
Since the Brundtland Report was published in 1987 as a result of the work of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, extensive research has been done by 
economists on how to improve environmental performance through pollution abatement, in 
some cases using capital expenditure as a proxy for environmental performance (Panayotou et 
al 1997, Ferraz and Seroa da Motta 2002, OECD 2001). Pollution abatement and control of 
residuals from production processes can be done either using end-of-pipe technology attached 
to a given production process, or by changing the process itself. Investment in the former does 
not affect the production process itself, and the amount of pollution generated; instead, it aims 
to treat pollution already generated. By contrast, investment in integrated technologies is 
synonymous with reducing the amount of potential pollutants at source, reducing the 
consumption of resources and energy, and recycling residues and used products. 
Some research has analysed specific external factors that drive companies to improve 
their environmental performance, such as regulatory regime or government support (Delmas, 
2003; Chan & Wong, 2006; Rivera, 2004; Rivera & de Leon, 2004; Rivera et al, 2006; Shin, 
2005,), pressure from local wealthy stakeholders, civil society, and foreign customers in Europe 
and Japan (Neumayer & Perkins 2004) and industry pressure (Guler et al. 2002, Corbett & 
Kirsch, 2004; Viadiu et al., 2006). Other research has focused on the role of internal 
organisational factors such as “organisational structure and culture.” Only a few studies have 
begun integrating key organisational characteristics with institutional theory. This approach can 
yield new insights into understanding differences between firms’ strategies. (Seroa da Motta, 
2006; Gunningham, 1995 ; Hoffman 2001).    6
Almost all these empirical studies focus on the developed countries. Additional 
challenges are faced by the developing economies, including the CEE countries such as 
Romania, which underwent a transition process. Under central planning, the well-known bias 
towards heavy industry combined with a lack of incentives to economise on inputs created 
considerable waste and pollution. Thus, in the transition countries production technologies are 
substantially less efficient than in the developed economies, and therefore emissions per unit of 
output are higher. In addition to the environmental problems inherited from the period of 
central planning, transition economies have experienced various other difficulties, including 
financial and economic hardship. The adjustment to market equilibrium is a gradual process, 
during which many variables such as provision of public goods, willingness to pay, technology 
and capital markets etc. are in disequilibrium. This creates both constraints and opportunities 
that may not be available to more “settled” economies. From an econometric viewpoint, the 
Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) is the most appropriate for our sample which contains 
hierarchical data structured in two levels (plant and county).  
 
3.  Econometric Analysis 
3.1 Econometric method 
 
In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis, 
hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The 
common element of all of these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function 
of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at one or more higher levels. 
The rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the 
dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors. This variation is 
not only a function of individual-level attributes, but also extra-individual factors. Besides, the 
relationship between lower-level and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not 
assumed to be fixed or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in 
micro-level models are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.  
Conceptually, the model is often viewed as a hierarchical system of regression 
equations. The simplest multilevel model that can be formulated takes into consideration only 
two levels of analysis
5. The analysis focuses on level-1 (individuals), whilst level-2 (group) 
provides the context for the level-1 units. For instance, in our case, level-1 units are the plants 
                                                           
5 For more details concerning MRM see Greene W. H. (2002).   7
who are nested in different counties (level-2 units). The dependent variable (note: in Yij , i 
refers to level-1 units and j refers to level-2 units) is measured for level-1 units, since this is the 
primary level of analysis. The explanatory variables are Xij for level-1 and Zj for level-2. By 
assumption, there are J groups and in each group there are Ni individuals. 
Thus, there is a separate regression equation for each group  
 
ij ij j j ij X Y ε β β + + = 1 0    with     (j = 1,2, …….J; i = 1,2,……N)      (1) 
where : 
β0 is the regression intercept; 
β1 is the regression slope for the explanatory variable X; 
εij is the residual term. 
To model group variation (this time for the level-2 units) in regression parameters 
additional equations are required, with the level-1 regression parameters as their dependent 
variables. The regressors include at least a constant, one level-2 explanatory variable and a 
disturbance.  
Thus, a typical level-2 model consists of the following equations: 
 
j j j u Z 0 01 00 0 + + = µ µ β  with (j = 1,2,….N)                             (2) 
j j ij u Z 1 11 10 + + = µ µ β   with (j = 1,2,….N)                             (3) 
After substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1), one obtains: 
 
ij j ij j j ij ij j ij u X u Z X X Z Y ε µ µ µ µ + + + + + + = 0 1 11 10 01 00             (4) 
 
where: µ00 is the intercept; µ01 µ10  are the  effect of the level-2 variable Zj on level-1 Xij ; µ11  is 
the cross-level interaction between the level-1 and level-2 variables. The last three terms in 
equation [4] are the disturbance terms. 
If there are P variables X at level-1 (lowest level) and Q variables Z at level-2 (highest 
level) the equations (1→4) become: 
ij
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p
p
ij pj j ij X Y ε β β + + = ∑
=1
0                                                                                    (1a) 
j
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where: 
µ are the regression coefficients (fixed parts of the model – they do not change across groups); 
u are the residuals at the group level; 
ε are the residuals at the individual level. The residuals u and ε are the random or stochastic 
part of the model. 
The multilevel model can be extended across more than two levels of analysis. In this 
case the parameters at the highest level of analysis are allowed to vary up to the next level. 
Always the parameters at the highest level of analysis are considered as fixed. A multilevel 
model extended to a greater number of levels produces structures that are even more complex 
and implies more complex disturbance term. Recent advances in computational power and 
software packages allows the analysis of at least 3-level models, and even nine levels, but the 
interpretation of complex multi-level models is very difficult. That is why more than two levels 
should not be included unless one has a clear rationale for doing so and strong expectations 
about the nature of the effects. 
 
   Model specification 
The econometric model considers four determinants of pollution expenditure: plant 
characteristics, market incentives, communities’ characteristics and regulation intensity. The 
dependent variable is plant environmental pollution expenditure (PACE) defined as: 
  
) , , , ( REGULATORY COMMUNITY MARKET PLANT f PACE =                                         (5)   
 
Plant - Plant characteristics, 
Market – Market incentives, 
Community - Community characteristics,  
Regulatory - Regulatory intensity. 
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Table 1 provides a list of variable definitions and a summary of theoretical priors for their 
effects on participation. 
Table 1  Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
Variables  Explanations  Sign 
Plant characteristics variables 
Product  Plant productivity as a measure of economic 
performance 
+ 
Debt Debt  ratio  measure of a company's financial leverage  - 
Turnover  Plant activity size defined as turnover  + 
Market incentives variables 
Iso  ISO 14000 certification, indicating environmental 
management adoption 
+ 
Mark  Listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange, proxy for the 
firm’s visibility  
+ 
Community characteristics variables 
UnEmp  Unemployment proxy for population welfare   - 
EnvNGO  Number  of environmental non-governmental 
organizations; proxy for population reactivity 
+ 
Regulatory intensity variables 
PollSect  Pollution industry sectors as proxy for intensity of the 
regulation -  command and control environmental policy 
instruments 
+ 
EnvGuard  Environmental penalties, proxy for the regulatory 
pressure to adopt an environmental behaviour- liability 
environmental policy instruments 
+ 
EnvTx  Environmental taxes, proxy for the economic incentives 
to adopt an environmental behaviour – economic 
environmental policy instruments 
+ 
EnvSub  Environmental subsidies, policy instruments to promote 
plant environmental behaviour- economic environmental 
policy instruments 
+ 
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Thus, the econometric specification used is the following: 
 
it it it
it it it it it
it it it it it
u Iso EnvGuard
EnvNGO UnEmp EnvSub EnvTx PolSect
Mark Turnover Debt oduct PACE
+ + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
11 10
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
) log(
) log( ) log( ) log( ) log(
) log( ) log( ) log( ) log(Pr ) log(
β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
 (6) 
where:  
•  PACEit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t 
•  Productit = plant productivity of plant i in year t 
•  Debtit = debt ratio of plant i in year t 
•  Turnoverit = turnover of plant i  in year t 
•  Markit = listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange of plant i in year t 
•  Isoit = dummy variable with value=1 if plant i  is certified ISO 14001 and 0 in other 
case  
•  UnEmpit = unemployment rate of county i  in year t 
•  EnvNGOit = number of environmental non-governmental organizations of county i  in 
year t 
•  PollSectit = dummy variable which takes value 1 if plant i becomes active in year t in 
pollution sectors and 0 otherwise 
•  EnvTxit = environmental taxes of plant i  in year t 
•  EnvSubit = environmental subsidies of plant i  in year t 
•  EnvGuardit = environmental penalties in county i  in the year t 
•  uit – error term 
 
3.3 Data 
 
The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are 
taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian 
National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost 
associated with pollution abatement efforts. Data from the survey are tabulated by industry.  
The data are in the form of a panel providing environmental and financial information at 
establishment level (on pollution abatement and control expenditure, environmental taxes and 
subsidies) and community characteristics and regulation intensity data at county level for the 
period 2002-2005. The sample contains 535 plants in 2002, 573 plants in 2003, 608 plants in   11
2004 and 593 plants in 2005 covering almost all industrial sectors. We selected only the plants 
with continuous activity in this period.  
The establishment characteristics (economic and financial information) are taken from 
plant financial reports. Also, we identified the firms who were traded on the capital market and 
listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, and those certified ISO 14001, using information from 
the Romanian Accreditation Association. The community characteristics were obtained from 
the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, except for the number of environmental ONG 
which comes from the Ministry of Environment. Using the information from Environmental 
Guard we constructed a proxy variable for regulation intensity (environmental penalties levied). 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Econometric results 
Variables  Coefficient  
Product 0.004  (2.12)** 
Debt -0.129  (7.03)*** 
Turnover 0.001  (1.74)* 
Mark 0.614  (15.18)*** 
Iso 0.046  (1.68)* 
EnvNGO 0.053  (1.15) 
UnEmp -0.087  (0.66) 
PollSect 0.173  (3.99)*** 
EnvGuard 0.099  (1.97)** 
EnvTx 0.007  (0.55) 
EnvSub 0.006  (1.99)** 
Observations 2309  - 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%; 
 
It can be seen that the signs of the statistically significant variables are in general as 
expected. The large and successful firms with capital availability are more likely to adopt an 
environmental behaviour and invest in environmental protection.    12
Market pressure from consumers, investors and competing firms, estimated by the 
adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, has a significant 
positive impact. 
The influence of community groups, proxied  by unemployment and the number of 
environmental non-governmental organisations, has no statistically significant impact on 
PACE. In general, in the transition economies the concern for the environment is not a top 
priority for the community, which is confronted with economical and financial problems.  
Public authorities which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are 
critical factor influencing plants’ decisions to take an environmental approach and carry out 
environmental investment. Environmental penalties and subsidies are found to have a 
statistically significant positive impact, whilst environmental taxes are not statistically 
significant.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about 
PACE patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in 
the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of economic and 
political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate 
econometric method, namely MRM.  
Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant 
characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure 
through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of 
plant PACE. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the 
population’s potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.  
Whether the influence of these stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its 
development process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes 
work as incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions 
of regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant 
characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. 
These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors increasing the 
level of plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. 
They point to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to achieve better outcomes.   13
Further, it appears that adopting measures to increase the population’s interest in environmental 
issues would also be useful in this respect.    14
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